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Book Reviews

La F ranee et les
fran~ais vus par les
voyageurs amerieains
1814.. 1948.
(2 vol.)
by

G. de Bertier de Sauvigny

Paris: Flammarion, 1982-1985.

nalists (10), artists (7), along with
others in government service (army,
navy, diplomacy, and consular service), bankers, merchants, lawyers,
and other men of affairs. As Cooper
observed, "There were no two travellers who saw precisely the same thing
or who saw them with the same eyes."
Yet, as Jean-Max Guieu of Georgetown
University comments, reviewing the
first volume of Bertier's exhilarating
survey in the French Review (57, October 1983, 125), '''The contribution of
this work, which in spite of the multiplicity of voices ... shows such consonance of opinion, rests notably in this
multiple American vision of France

n a day when even elementary school
venture abroad, visitors' opinIionspupils
of countries not their own are
surd y commonplace. Students of
American history are only too familiar
with Europe's views of us as expressed
in Alexis de Toqueville's De la Democratie en Amerique, Frances Trollope's
Domestic Manners of Americans, or
Dickens' comical description of stagecoach travel in the States. What others
have thought of us is no secret.
But what have we, in our travels,
thought of them? A delightful and
splendidly researched answer, at least
as to Paris and France, may be found in
Bertier de Sauvigny's recent volumes
covering the first half of the nineteenth
century. Renowned as the authority on
the French Restoration era, and most
recently the biographer of Metternich,
Bertier is as comfortably at home in the
States as in his native France, having
taught in many of the great universities
throughout the nation, and numbering
among his friends distinguished American historians. His approach to both
his homeland and American visitors to
it is a provocative olio of admiration,
irony, good-humored raillery, and
fond indulgence.
Bertier's roster of voyageurs includes names as well-known as novelist
James Fenimore Cooper, historian
George Bancroft, orator Edward
Everett, suffragette Julia Ward Howe,
artist Rembrandt Peale, and educator
Emma Willard. Altogether he has selected, from an estimated 30,000
Americans who crossed the Atlantic
between 1814 and 1848, some 170
travellers who were not only literate
but literary, as these fastidiously selected excerpts from their published
works attest. They represent a wide
range of views: those of doctors and
medical students (25), clergymen (18),
women (15), men ofletters (13), jour-

UWhen I left home
I thought it could never
happen that I could cry
on leaving any other
country ... but then,
I had not seen Paris."

under the constitutional monarchy, at
the precise epoque of Toqueville."
Since these Americans taken together commented on almost every
aspect of French society and culture,
the twenty-six chapters of Volume 1
(published in 1982) furnish a veritable
Guide Bleu to the City of Lights and la
belle France surrounding it in the days
of Washington Irving, Samuel Topliff,
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow,
Margaret Fuller, Samuel F. B. Morse,
Lewis Cass, George Catlin, and the
lesser lights who visited there. The
reader travels by proxy the voyage
across the Atlantic, visits the cafes and
restaurants, strolls the streets and public gardens, visits prisons and cemeteries, and views with awe the museums and monuments. Beyond Paris he
leisurely explores the departements
where the French were predominantly
a rural, agricultural people. In short,
through the eyes of Bertier's delegates,
one generally explores the visible
forms of France et les franifais.
The second volume of this engaging
retrospect, published three years later,
is even more to this reviewer's liking.
As the third major division of the
whole work, it centers on the people
themselves, their character, personali-

ty, their daily life -- economic, political, intellectual, religious -- giving one
the sense of actually living in the France
into which Emile Zola was born.
The position of women startled
some Americans. "Women of all
classes knew business and managed
these affairs as well and perhaps better
then men." Though until 1838 they
were forbidden on the floor of the
Bourse, they speculated in the stock
market from the small Cafe du Report.
In France women of sixty-five were
more charming, better company, than
twenty-five-year-olds were thought to
be in other countries. Married women
enjoyed greater independence than in
the States, and in Paris seemed free to
go anywhere unescorted. Many
dressed as men, and one tailor specialized in adjusting masculine clothes to
the womanly figure. Bertier comments
dryly, "The conduct of George Sand
would appear less extravagant than one
was sometimes tempted to believe."
Bertier is equally tongue-in-cheek
introducing the section on dogs: "Finally one must not forget a not inconsiderable portion of the parisienne population constituted by its inhabitants with
four paws. The stranger is always surprised at their number and the importance humans attribute to them." The
Americans most astonished by the
rank canines enjoyed in France were
the Iowa Indians whom George Catlin
had brought with him to Paris. After
taking a census of ladies with dogs, and
the numerous pets -- leashed or unleashed, riding en voiture or on their
mistress' arm -- the Indians presented it
gravely to their guide, inquiring why
dogs were kissed on the mouth, but
children on the forehead. Particularly,
after visiting an orphanage, they demanded why these women did not
adopt a baby, instead of a dog.
La France et les fran<;ais must be read
in its entirety (with a French dictionary
close at hand) for the density of its
detail, the elegance of its style, the
panoramic picture it furnishes, and the
sheer pleasure of its lore. Although
Americans continued to believe their
own country superior to any other,
many left France with the sentiments of
young Augusta Colles, who confided
to her journal, "When I left home I
thought it could never happen that I
could cry on leaving any other country
... but then, I had not seen Paris."
Annabelle M. Melville
Professor of History Emerita
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Book Reviews continued

Wickedness:
A Philosophical Essay
Mary Midgley
Routledge & Kegan Paul

1984
hy do people act as badly as they
sometimes do? Why are human
W
beings callous, cruel, vindictive, selfish, exploitive, manipulative? What
are the sources of human wickedness,
evil, wrong doing, vice, immorality?
Philosophers have long worked to expand our comprehension of such positive notions as goodness, morality,
duty, virtue and happiness. By comparison, their consideration of the nature
of evil and its sources has been slight
most often peripheral to other inquiries. Mary Midgley's Wickedness
offers at least a partial corrective to this
neglect. But her work is not merely the
product of an intellectual's curiosity
about an underexplored topic. Midgley
knows that evil undermines us and we
have no hope of controlling it unless
we understand evil and its origins.
Where should we look to uncover
the spring of evil in our lives? To the
mysterious workings of God? To a
cosmic diabolic force which opposes
the separate force of goodness? To a
destructive element within nature? To
the dynamics of flawed social structures? With varying degrees of thoroughness, Midgley considers and rejects each of these approaches to understanding human evil in terms of something external to individuals. The locus
of the insertion of evil into human
reality is human beings themselves.
And inquiry into such evil must focus
on human nature. To her examination
of evil and human nature, Midgley
brings the conviction that we are,
above all, persons, requiring an integrated personality, integrity and responsibility, in pursuit of a good life.
Accordingly, her book has at least
three primary goals: to dissuade us
from misguided approaches to understanding evil, to expand our comprehension of persons as purposive
agents, and to identify the sources of
evil within human nature. Throughout, Wickedness builds upon a profound project to deepen our self-knowledge carried out in two of her earlier
works, Beast and Man: The Roots of
Human Nature and Heart and Mind: The
Varieties of Moral Experience.
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The prophet Jeremiah knew where
to look for the root of evil -- to the
human heart. "The heart is deceitful
above all things, and desperately wicked: who can know it?" Ueremiah 17:9)
Midgley agrees that the source of human evil is the heart. But contrary to
the implication ofJeremiah's question,
she believes that we must attempt to
know the heart and that we can know
it. Our biggest obstacle to doing so is a
variety of misconceptions about the
motives, drives and feelings harbored
in the heart. There is a common tendency to believe that human nature is
polluted by one or several inherently
evil motives or drives. For example,
aggression is sometimes viewed as an
innate, positive, solitary, irresistible
drive which alone causes human wickedness. Midgley argues that such a view
is completely mistaken and tends to
reflect an untenable conception of human motivation. Not all wickedness is
aggressive, much of it results from
other motivations, e.g., fear, sloth,
greed, habit. Nor is all aggression wicked. 'Aggression' refers to an inclination
to attack others, most often out of
anger. It functions mainly to drive
others away, thereby providing individuals with the space needed to carry out
the business of living. As a motive, it
produces evil only when it is out of
control.
Midgley finds fear as a motivating
force to provide an interesting parallel
to aggression. Certainly, fear is an
innate element in human beings and it
can lead to despicable acts and worthless lives. This is especially true when
our response to fear is cowardice.
However, fear is an essential aspect of
human existence and our response to it
need not, and often does not, result in
any wrongdoing. Fear is an emotive
recognition of danger to something of
value, whether it be oneself, others or
things. The pursuit of well-being requires such recognition. Fear becomes
destructive when we fear the wrong
things or when our fear is out of
proportion to the danger encountered.
Fear and aggression are natural motives
and essential elements of a good life
"because they are responses to evil,
and there are always some evils which
ought to be feared, and some which
ought to be attacked." Our task is not
to eradicate these motives or to become fatalistic about them, but to
direct them properly.
Midgley's approach is distinctly
Aristotelian. Human beings have a variety of natural capacities and needs. All

of us tend to become angry, fearful,
competitive, desirous of pleasure and
so forth. Wickedness does not arise in
human life simply because we have
such motives. Each of these natural
motives is linked with a wide range of
possible behavior and only some acts
within each range are wicked. Our
propensity for good or evil depends
largely on the character traits we develop in connection with each of these
motivational capacities. Virtuous traits
are life enhancing and bring us to feel
anger, fear, desire for pleasure, etc. at
the right times, with reference to the
right objects, toward the right people
and with the right motive. However, as
Midgley notes, "to be capable of these
virtues is also to be capable of corresponding vices, just as the possibility of
physical strength carries with it that of
physical weakness." Here she develops
the idea, deriving from the ancient
Greeks, that evil is essentially negative,
a type of dysfunction, a general sort of
failure to live as we are capable of
living. The problem of dysfunction is
complicated by the fact that our various natural motives tend to conflict. It
is a matter for the heart or character to
strike compromises among the strong,
constant feelings and motives which
clash within us. The kind of character
we have determines what sort of compromises we are likely to strike and,
thereby, whether and to what extent we
bring evil into the world. Compromises for the good arise when we view
our motives and feelings not as occasional and isolated, but as part of an
ordered set within the context of a way
of life. Motives and feelings are linked
with universal human needs. Needs
come as a set and have some structure.
"When increasing intelligence brings
to consciousness conflicts which in
other animals seem to pass unnoticed,
human beings are forced, on pain of
distintegration, to form some kind of
policies for reconciling their contrary
impluses. This makes some kind of
morality necessary, and the nature of
the contending motives lays limits on
what kind it can be."
Working with this model of human
agency, she explores the development
and manifestations of the dysfunctional root of human wickedness. Inner conflict between competing motives is a typical and constant feature of
our personal identity. A good and
viable way of life requires selfknowledge, self-criticism and the
maintenance of an inward balance of
competing motives. However, we have

a tendency to divide ourselves into the
self we esteem and affirm and its darker
shadow which we deny. Thus, we re~
fuse to acknowledge motives which are
in fact our own and regard them as
alien to us, often projecting them onto
other persons. Through this self~decep~
tion vice easily grips us and becomes
especially pernicious. When the bal~
ance of motives is insecure and incom~
plete, obsession becomes a possibility,
with all motives giving way to a ruling
passion. Certain desires become de~
tached from the rest of character,
which atrophies so that the person
disintegrates. The badness of bad mo~
tives most often derives from the break~
down of an internal system of counter~
balancing motives, especially concern
for others.
Though Midgley focuses on the
source of evil, she also inquires about a
large variety of topics, including the
nature of science, moral scepticism,
determinism, free will, chance, com~
munal persecution, temptation, cul~
tural relativism, Freudian theory and
evolution. While this rich diversity of
topics makes her work fascinating, the
nucleus of ideas connecting these in~
quiries is sometimes lost and generally
underdeveloped. Also, some of her key
notions -- e.g., "wickedness," "mo~
tive," "agency," "drive" ~~ are desper~
ately in need of more careful analysis
given the heavy work they do in her
book. Overall, Midgley's work is a
worthy complement to two other re~
cent philosophical treatises on human
evil ~~ Judith Shklar's Ordinary Vices
and Ronald Milo's Immorality.
David Cheney
Professor of Philosophy

Actual Minds,
Possible Worlds
Jerome Bruner

Harvard University Press
Cambridge and London, 1986
et's assume you have read some of
the articles in this issue of the
L
Bridgewater Review before getting to
this one. It is unlikely that you stopped
to consider how the reading of them
resulted in your knowing something
new, not just in terms of how your eyes
work, or even how the brain records

information, but how the whole phe~
nomenally complex process operates.
Such abstract and involved issues rare~
ly intrude on our everyday lives. We
read or watch or do something and
learn from the experience and that, as
the saying goes, it that.
It is such hard work to consider
issues like the relationship between
language and knowing. Most of us lack
the knowledge, time or skill to even
begin. However, such barriers should
not reduce our interest in difficult
questions, especially when there are
thinkers like Jerome Bruner who can
bring the results of their comprehen~
sive studies to us in clear, energetic
language. Bruner shows in his newest
book, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds,
that the effort needed to study such
large, abstract questions is worthwhile.
Bruner has long sought the key to the
relationship between language and
knowing. Although he is recognized as
an important developmental psycholo~
gist, he also has the rare ability of the
philosopher to elevate discussions to
the level of what it means to be human.
Of course, nothing is more uniquely
human than our capacity for utilizing
language to determine and understand
our circumstances.
Bruner's most recent work with
Harvard University's Project Zero
research into the relationship between
artistry, language, and culture gen~
erated enormous expectation and
promise.
In Actual Minds, Possible Worlds,
Bruner delivers on the promise, accom~
plishing three significant goals. First,
he presents the results of his research
into important aspects of develop~
mental psychology. Second, Bruner
has gathered and synthesized a much
larger body of relevant thought, from a
great many of the world's outstanding
theorists in very diverse fields, to shed
new light on the entire language pro~
cess and its specific application in
literature. Third, Bruner's work in this
book provides a secure new base from
which further exploration can be car~
ried out. All the bricks of this intellec~
tual edifice, no matter how widely
scattered their points of origin, have
been solidly mortared together, and
the whole has greater strength by virtue
of having been put together by a
thinker of Bruner's prominence.
At its highest level, AM, PW repre~
sents a new approach, a new view of
how the mind works. The author
guides the reader carefully along the
way, writing about the most complex

research into the language process in
his own clear and energetic language.
The reader never feels pulled or pushed
along awkwardly, but rather simply
follows step by step. The view is
fascinating.
There are three major areas. Each is
composed of two or more essays originally written between 1980 and 1984,
now rewritten and realigned as parts of
a comprehensive whole.
Part I, Two Natural Kinds begins with
ages-old questions concerning the problems of multiple interpretations or
meanings in literature. These essays do
not provide answers, but suggest new
approaches to asking questions.
Bruner contends that in literature, the
plot, (composed of a line of incidents)
and the themes (composed of a pattern
of meaning) continually interact so
that the reader must respond by adjusting understanding while continuing to
read. The reader changes through the
process. Bruner distinguishes between
what he calls "actual" and "virtual"
text. The actual, or printed text causes
the reader to perform by creating a
virtual, or interpreted text.
Reading a good story and perform~
ing the meanings of the virtual text
represent a way of thinking, a system of
description and explanation very different from another mode, that of the
well-formed argument, the logicoscientific or the formal mathematical
system of description and explanation.
Bruner calls the second mode of
thought paradigmatic and the literary
mode of thought narrative. The paradigmatic mode achieves truth through
proof: if x, then y. The narrative mode
achieves lifelikeness through the appearance of truth: Romeo died, then
Juliet. "Great fiction, like great mathematics, requires the transformation of
intuitions into expressions in a symbolic system ~- natural language or a
more artificialized form of it." (The
paradigmatic mode can prove truths
once they have been formulated, but
not until then: if x must first be intu~
ited. It may shock us that Newton and
Einstein created their respective
theories of gravity and relativity suddenly, as whole pictures, not mathe~
matical symbols, yet we expect that
kind of sudden whole creation of our
authors.)
In the narrative mode, the action
includes a consciousness, which
knows, feels, thinks about presupposed circumstances. These presuppositions imply multiple meanings when
they are triggered through complex
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language transformations (verb forms
which include the psychological process in their actions): Tom Sawyer
seems to enjoy whitewashing the fence.
Bruner describes this process as "subjunctivizing reality [through language
by] triggering presuppositions."
Readers also have a strategy and a
repertoire that they bring to bear on a
text. The reader's strategy determines
how the presuppositions of the virtual
text are reconciled with the reader's
repertoire of possible human realities.
These subjunctive realities, created
for and by the reader, exist among
many possible realities, many possible
worlds. "It is far more important, for
appreciating the human condition, to
understand the ways human beings
construct their worlds" than it is to
compare them to a concept of a fundamental, objective reality. Artists create
possible worlds through metaphor,
which functions as a comparison that
transforms the givens, the conventional presuppositions, as the actual
text is transformed into the virtual text.
Scientists also engage in a wide ranging
variety of world making, (sometimes
even transforming the givens for description and explanation, as in current
theoretical physics). The proof of a
scientific theory achieves "a universality through context independence... ,
invariant across human intentions and
human plights." The appearance of
truth of a work of art achieves a
universality through "context sensitivity, ... understanding the world as it
reflects the requirements of living in
it." Considering Tom Sawyer and E =
mc 2 , each is a comparison between the
variable and the given, and experiencing each creates a transformed
world. There are many possible worlds
from which to choose.
Part II, Language and Reality, begins
with an examination of the ways in
which the social, interactive nature of
human beings requires a complex set of
shared assumptions and beliefs about
mechanisms, results, intentions, definitions, and so on. The process of these
transactions is negotiated by "the capacity of language to create and stipulate realities of its own, ...by warning,
by encouraging, by naming, and by the
manner in which words invite us to
create 'realities' in the world to correspond with them, .. .for example, the
law, gross national product, antimatter, the Renaissance." (The law, for
example, creates corresponding realities, such as legislatures, courts, police,
jails, and rehabilitation centers.) Indi30

The primary difference
between arts and sciences
is not the conflict
between objectivity
and subjectivity.
...rather a difference
in the use
of symbol systems.

vidual behavior in a human culture
depends upon extensive negotiation of
agreement for the transactions to take
place, comparable to interpreting an
ambiguous text in literature. In this
sense, interpreting the literature of our
culture seems to provide "a map of
possible roles and of possible worlds in
which action, thought, and self-definition are permissible (or desirable) ... ,
the major link between our own sense
of self and our sense of others in the
social world around us."
As individuals, and as a whole culture, human beings interpret given circumstances in different ways at different times, for example in ways dependent upon the age of the interpreter. "Contrary to common sense,
there is no unique 'real world' that preexists and is independent of human
mental activity and human symbolic
language; (but) what we call the world
is a product of some mind whose
symbolic procedures construct the
world." The primary difference between arts and sciences is not the
conflict between objectivity and subjectivity. It is rather a difference in the
use of symbol systems, but both attempt to understand the world by
creating a version of it with a symbolic
language. (A mathematical version and
a biological version can seem to differ
as greatly as a sculptural and a musical
version.) In every version, the reality is
what we stipulate, rather than find, and
what we make of it in thought, action,
and emotion. "We know the world in
different ways, from different stances,
and each of the ways in which we know
it produces different structures, or
representations, or, indeed, 'realities'
... We give different 'reality' status to
experiences we create from our differently formed encounters with the
world .... We place a canonical value on
certain stances that yield certain forms
of knowledge, certain possible
worlds." The rational, logical, scientific, paradigmatic worlds now seem to

dominate Western cultures, yet multiple versions of reality, or forms that
reality can take, or possible worlds, can
be accepted as independently truthful,
despite the apparent contradictions at
the heart of such tasks as determining
school curriculum. (We accept and try
to understand the truthful coexistence
of biology and friendship, psychology
and justice, physics and music.)
In Part III, Acting in Constructed
Worlds, Bruner explores the tangible
effects of language on the multiple
social worlds we construct. "A culture
itself comprises an ambiguous text that
is constantly in need of interpretation
by those who participate in it." The
constant recreation of our culture
through reinterpretation and renegotiation of its multiple meanings establishes the concept of culture as a forum
for that process whereby "language
creates social reality." There are three
forms in which we structure experiences, from which we construct our
many realities: the experience of the
senses;the symbolically encoded experience we gain through interacting with
our social world; and the vicarious
experience we achieve in the act of
reading. The narrative mode of
thought in our culture's literature is
essential in teaching us how in interpret, negotiate, and understand our
evolving culture. When developmental
psychology becomes an ever more active influence in the interpretation of
our culture, the theory of the evolution
of human beings as a species seems to
enlarge. Not only genes, but culture as
well is reponsible for the development
of brain function. "The literary artist
...becomes an agent in the evolution of
mind -- but not without the co-optation of the reader as his fellow author."
In AM, PW Jerome Bruner has set
himself a seemingly impossible task, as
all explorers do. He rarely delivers less
than he promised, and often more than
we have expected. His focus, however,
is limited by its bias toward a paradigmatic, logical-scientific approach, even
when evaluating the narrative mode of
thought. Bruner counts the number of
verb transformations in literature. It
seems an odd and limiting analytical
tool for someone who has argued that
literature is by nature metaphorical. A
more holistic process for the analysis
of literature would seem appropriate,
given Bruner's theories.
Stephen M. Levine
Professor of Theatre Arts

